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ABSTRACT 
The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I: The Rock 
of the Marne 
by 
Stephen Coode 
 
American participation in the First World War developed 
slowly throughout 1917 to a mighty torrent during the last 
six months of the war. United States participation 
undoubtedly helped not only repel but to stop all German 
assaults on the Western Front: it had substantially aided 
in defeating Imperial Germany. 
 
Through primary and secondary sources a timeline, as well 
as a few of the more significant events, has been 
established following the United States’ involvement in the 
war. Special attention has been focused on the United 
States Third Infantry Division and its part in the July 15-
17, 1918 Second Battle of the Marne. 
 
The Third Infantry Division would see the war throughout 
its remaining battles and aid in the occupation of Germany. 
However, it is most famous for the Marne battle. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TRAINING AND PREPARATION, A.E.F. 
Formally declared by the United States Congress on 6 
April 1917, war against the Imperial German government and 
its military forces, for the United States, would be a war 
unlike America theretofore had ever prosecuted. In 1917 
Germany had once again begun its unrestricted submarine 
warfare, resulting in severed ties between the United 
States and Germany: the German ambassador in Washington, 
Count von Bernsdorf, was dismissed and unless Germany was 
willing to halt its submarine forces President Wilson would 
refuse further negotiations. Due to the German High 
Commands opinion of the U.S. being weak and inefficient---
it refused to restrict its submarines---it had unknowingly 
sown its demise. 
As a result of the illegal British blockade of 
Germany, the German High Command in February 1915 
promulgated a blockade of its own around the British Isles. 
Since the U.S. had strong economic ties with Great Britain, 
it was likely there would be in the future a U.S. 
confrontation with Germany. Germany viewed the sinking of 
merchant vessels as self defense due to the manner in which 
Great Britain detained ships: if Great Britain could stop 
commerce and trade by blocking neutral countries shipping 
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with Germany, the Germans could do the same with countries 
trading with Great Britain. However, Germany had been 
forewarned by the U.S. that if any U.S. shipping or the 
lives of its citizens were lost due to German interference, 
the U.S. would hold Germany directly accountable for such 
losses. The U.S. would suffer losses of shipping and its 
citizens, notably the Lusitania in 1915, for the next two 
years. The entrance of the United States in World War I can 
therefore be directly linked to the German High Command’s 
failure in restricting its unrestricted submarine warfare 
against American shipping, the Zimmerman Telegram of 
February 1917, and the ever increasing mortality rate of 
American sea merchants. 
In late April 1917, British and French leaders sailed 
to the United States for talks with American government 
officials concerning America’s active participation in the 
war. The American effort was paramount to Allied success: 
the weary French troops and a shortage of British manpower 
at the close of 1917, as well as their lack of reserves and 
resources, made clear their ill equipped forces could not 
meet the demands of another year of warfare on the Western 
Front. All parties involved agreed the U.S. must do 
something to lessen the strain on the Allies and in May 
1917 General John J. Pershing was selected to command the 
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American Expeditionary Force. 1 Pershing was, at the outset 
and without exception, given full and total control of the 
AEF: it would not be Washington, Paris, or London 
commanding the Americans, it would be only Pershing.2 
President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker would 
provide Pershing full directives as how best to conduct the 
AEF; essentially, Pershing would have full discretion on 
how best to use American troops to implement those 
directives.  
Pershing’s extensive command authority by necessity, 
however, dictated that he must cooperate with the French 
and British governments as well as their field commanders; 
and not just with the French and British but his overall 
mission was to cooperate with all Allied countries in their 
functions against Imperial Germany. First, though, General 
Pershing would need the necessary manpower to fill the 
fledgling AEF. 
Before 1917 the U.S. armed forces was nowhere near the 
500,000 men the Selective Service Act, passed on 19 May 
1917 called for; upon entering the war the regular army of 
the U.S. was composed of roughly 130,000 men and the 
                                                
1
 Thomas Fleming, “Iron General,” in The Great War: Perspectives 
on The First World War, ed. Robert Cowley (New York: Random House, 
2003), 411. 
2Thomas G. Frothingham, The American Reinforcement in The World 
War (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1927; reprint, 1971), 77. 
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National Guard contained around 67,000 troops. The SSA 
called for an army of 500,000 men and, if needed, more men 
would be made available through the draft. With voluntary 
enlistments and the ongoing draft the U.S. armed forces, by 
the end of hostilities in November 1918, would reach 
4,000,000 men. The enlargements of the Regular U.S. Army as 
well as the National Guard were the primary reasons for the 
SSA. Nevertheless, the 4,000,000 combined U.S. servicemen 
at war’s end are simply astonishing: the American people’s 
willingness to take part in the war---to voluntarily fill 
the ranks of a badly needed military force--was 
unprecedented in U.S. history.3  
Started in 1915 by General Leonard Wood, the 
Plattsburg Plan was initiated for the training of the 
volunteers; surprisingly, most of the men who volunteered 
were professionals and businessmen. Some of the 
professional soldiers tasked with training those men were 
veterans of the recent campaign in Mexico; both regular 
Army and National Guardsmen, commanded by Pershing, had 
been sent to the Texas-New Mexico border with Mexico to 
repel border crossings and raids by Mexican bandits. The 
benefits of these experiences for the building and training 
                                                
3Girard Lindsley McEntee, Military History of The World War (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 368-369. 
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of a large national defense force were immediately 
apparent: the improved efficiency of the regular Army as 
well as the National Guard would greatly aid in the 
training of the volunteers and, moreover, increased the 
morale of the fighting men. As will be shown later, the 
camaraderie and morale of America’s fighting men would be 
put to the test when Operation Michael, the great German 
offensive of spring 1918, would bring the U.S. Third 
Infantry Division face to face with a powerful German army. 
Aside from the above stated informal directives from 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker about how Pershing was to 
assume his duties, a more formal set of instructions from 
Baker followed on 26 May 1917:  
 
    In military operations against the Imperial German Government 
you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other 
countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the 
underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United 
States are a separate and distinct component of the combined 
forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental 
rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular 
circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to 
when your command or any of its parts is ready for action is 
confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in 
determining the manner of cooperation. But until the forces of the 
United States are, in your judgment, sufficiently strong to 
warrant operations as an independent command, it is understood 
that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you may be 
assigned to by the French Government.4 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4U.S. Historical Division, Department of The Army: Office of 
Military History, United States Army in The World War, 1917-1919, vol. 
1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 3.  
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The Third United States Infantry Division originated 
in North Carolina, its troops arriving from eleven 
different posts throughout the U.S. Totaling in excess of 
27,714 men and officers by 18 September 1918, the 3rd ID was 
at the apex of its divisional capabilities: it would never 
again exceed that number throughout the war. 5 It must be 
remembered that the U.S./AEF divisional strength and 
organization far exceeded those of the French and British. 
The typical Continental differences in divisional strength 
were---and rightly so---a major concern for the Allied 
commanders. A single American Infantry Division, 28,000 men 
and officers, posed serious problems to the logistics and 
supply network already established in France: a single 
division alone would consume enormous quantities of 
supplies, require a vast network of supply lines and 
transportation, and need large port facilities as well as 
bases and access to railroads. Therefore, the American 
reliance on French artillery, airplanes, and other weapons 
and supplies caused considerable logistical problems at the 
onset of American involvement.  
The French and British armies had set timetables and 
formulae based on the size of their divisions. The 
                                                
5Gaul, Jeffrey. History of The Third Infantry Division: Rock of 
The Marne (Kentucky: Turner Publishing, 1988), 12.  
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unusually large American formations disrupted these 
calculations: for example, how long it would take a 
division to march a certain number of miles, using a 
certain length of road; the number of railroad cars needed 
for the transport of an entire American division; and, 
possibly the most important factor, the logistical concerns 
of supplying an entire AEF division. Despite French and 
British demands to Baker concerning the size of U.S. 
divisions, Baker, believing Pershing to be competent, not 
to mention Commander in Chief in France, “would not deviate 
from a principle [Pershing’s proposed divisional strength] 
which he knew was sound.”6   
As previously mentioned, the Third United States 
Infantry Division was a hodgepodge of army units from posts 
throughout the U.S. Of the 27,714 men and officers 
comprising the 3rd, the infantry was broken down into the 5th 
and 6th Brigades and further divided into the 4th and 7th 
Infantry Regiments as well as the 9th Machine Gun Battalion. 
There were artillery units, as well: the 10th Field 
Artillery Regiment (75mm) from Arizona as well as the 76th 
from Hattiesburg, Mississippi and the 105mm Artillery Unit 
from Texas. Topping off the field artillery units was a 
                                                
6Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America at War, vol. 1 (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1931), 255.  
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trench mortar battery and, finally, the 7th Machine Gun 
Battalion, 5th Field Signal Battalion, and the 6th Engineer 
and Headquarters unit. The Sixth Engineers were the first 
of the division to arrive in France and, ironically, would 
be the first troops of the division engaged in combat on 
the continent: engineers, theoretically, were not usually 
the first to go into combat.7 
On 28 May 1917 General Pershing left the U.S. and 
headed for Paris. Accompanied by a small staff he set up 
his headquarters in Paris, where he went to work planning 
the overall combined effort the AEF was to play in the war. 
Visualizing that the AEF would eventually number around 
three million men on the continent, he set about planning 
how to organize, train, house, and maintain the forces he 
envisioned taking to the fight. But first he had to find a 
solution for the transport of such a large force and, 
moreover, had to factor into that equation the British and 
French resources available at the time. When the U.S. 
entered the war, she was not a leading naval power: the 
French and British dominated the earth’s oceans. In a 
cablegram he sent on 6 July 1917 Pershing evaluated, in 
part: 
 
                                                
7Gaul, 12.  
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    Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men 
 by next May….Inasmuch as question affects all allies whose 
 common interests demand that we exert maximum military power 
 consistent with transport problem, suggest early agreement be 
 reached among Allies which would provide requisite 
 transportation.8  
 
 
Soon after arriving in France Pershing proposed to the 
U.S. War Department his recommendation for the overall 
organization and logistics of the AEF. Four specific 
projects comprised the organizational recommendation: 1) 
the General Organizational Project, 2) Service of the Rear 
Project, 3) the Tank Project and 4) the Schedule of 
Priority of Shipments. The above cablegram indicates the 
urgent need for immediate approval of the recommendation, 
which was given on 11 July 1917. Upon completion of a joint 
study, headed by Colonel Chauncey Baker and including staff 
officers of Pershing's top subordinate commanders, as well 
as the War Department as a whole, the final outcome was an 
organized, balanced American force suitable for fighting a 
modern war.9 
The first major contingent of the AEF set sail for 
Europe on 12 June 1917. Led by General William L. Sibert, 
the First Expeditionary Division would provide the basis 
for an American army that by the end of the war would 
constitute forty-three American divisions. Thirty-two camps 
                                                
8U.S. Historical Division, vol. 1, 4.     
9Ibid.   
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would be established throughout the U.S. for mobilization 
and training purposes; from medical personnel to machine 
gunners, training policy was set in 1917 for a period of 
sixteen weeks. What astonished Pershing about the training 
the men were receiving was that there was at first no 
emphasis on individual rifle marksmanship, and that it was 
geared for small-unit training with no provisions for 
training as a combined, large-unit arms team. Moreover, 
training was emphasized in trench warfare. For Pershing and 
his desire for mobile, non-static combat, trench warfare 
training simply would not do: the American soldier needed 
mobility, traversing barbed-wire and pushing the enemy from 
his trenches and fighting them in open space with bayonet 
and rifle, if he were to succeed in his fight against the 
Boche.10 The need for mobilizing the American forces was 
only one significant dimension of America’s involvement in 
the war: the mobilization of the American economy in time 
of war was another. However, the economy would prove much 
more difficult to mobilize than would the American forces.11 
 The Council of Defense was formed in 1916 after the 
National Defense Act was enacted the same year: a concern 
of American military thought for over a century, 
                                                
10
“Passing Troops Over Wire Entanglements,” File 203-53. RG 120. 
11U.S. Army Center of Military History, “ The U.S. Army in World 
War I, 1917-1918” (6 March 2008) www.history.army.mil/books/amh-
v2/PDF/chapter01.pdf (accessed 9 September 2006). 
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mobilization and training of American manpower and industry 
was not necessarily new to the military---or economic---
leadership. The War Industries Board replaced the outdated 
Munitions Standard Board, made up of civilian as well as 
military representatives for the purpose of coordinating, 
prioritizing, creating new industry as well as converting 
the existing manufacturing companies to a wartime status, 
and producing materials for the army and the navy. Bernard 
Baruch would lead the War Industries Board in expediting 
the much needed economic and industrial might of the United 
States.  
Even with the tremendous effort by Baruch to 
coordinate and encourage the production and development of 
weapons, the demand for those weapons was so great and 
immediate that, consequently, the AEF would depend heavily 
on Allied (especially French) weapons, particularly tanks, 
airplanes, and artillery. However, small and individual 
arms productions in the United States as well as uniform 
and food distribution methods were much more successful in 
supplying the AEF. Many top military officials, such as 
Major General George W. Goethals, relied heavily on 
businessmen-turned-soldiers like Charles G. Dawes and 
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William W. Atterbury12, the A.E.F.’s General Purchasing 
Agent in Europe and supervisor of the A.E.F.’s 
transportation system, respectively.13 
Pershing moved his General Headquarters in September 
1917 to Chaumont where, centrally located to where the 
planned American Front lines would presumably be 
established, he and his staff would supervise the training 
of American troops. By the Fall of 1917, there were four 
divisions----the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd---as well as a 
brigade of U.S. Marines in France and all needed, among 
other things, trench, chemical, demolition, mortar, and 
grenade training. As mentioned above, the entire AEF would 
need advanced bayonet and rifle training. Men such as 
Corporal James B. Gresham, Private Thomas F. Enright, and 
Private Merle D. Hay might have survived, had they received 
proper training, a German raid on a trenchline they shared 
with their French allies, but they did not: they were the 
first three deaths of the AEF’s campaign in Europe.14  
On 21 March 1918 Chateauvillain was designated as 
headquarters of the U.S. Third Infantry Division. Known as 
the Ninth Area for Billeting and Training, it was made 
                                                
12Army and Navy, “Pershing’s A.E.F” (11 May 1931) 
 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,741623,00.html 
(accessed 15 February 2008). 
13U.S. Army Center of Military History, 23-24.  
14U.S. Army Center of Military History, 21-26.  
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available to the 3rd ID as an area of concentration for 
training the division’s troops. The area encompassed 300 
square miles, contained some lowland as well as high 
ground, and occupied the west-central territory of Haute-
Marne, located some 10 miles west of Chaumont where the AEF 
headquarters was located. As means of transport and 
equipment became available, and coupled with the arrival of 
troops, means of organization, training, and instruction 
began to give the division a semblance of a cohesive 
fighting force.15 Command of the division was entrusted to 
Major General Joseph T. Dickman. Back in the U.S., Dickman 
had commanded Camp Greene in North Carolina and was 
promoted to command the 3rd ID in late November, 1917. 
Before the war he was present with Pershing in Cuba in 
1898, and later was Inspector General on Pershing’s staff; 
he was an instructor for several military schools teaching 
organization, strategies and tactics, and military history. 
Overall, Dickman was well prepared for his eventual 
participation in Europe in April, 1918.16 
 The 4th, 7th, 38th, and 30th infantry regiments of the 3rd 
ID arrived by 21 April and a final schedule for the full 
training of the division arrived from army headquarters on 
                                                
15Joseph T. Dickman, The Great Crusade (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1927), 36-38.  
16John J. Pershing, foreword to The Great Crusade, by Joseph T. 
Dickman (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), vii-viii. 
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the 28th. In poor condition and looking haggard, horses from 
the French Army arrived for divisional use on 2 May; in 
order to bring the horses to operational use, items such as 
housing (stables), food, water, and other necessities vital 
for the health and maintenance of the very important 
animals were needed. Unimportant to untrained eyes, the 
horses were valuable as a means to wage an early 20th 
century war. Moreover, the accomplishments of the 3rd ID in 
regard to their treatment and training of their horses, as 
well as the speedy construction of the animals’ facilities, 
were two not insignificant achievements of the division 
that was to make its reputation as the ‘Rock of The Marne’. 
Continued favorable weather conditions of those early days 
in France permitted the division’s training to progress 
smoothly; this was fortunate for the French and British, 
being beaten back as they were during the German Michael 
Offensive launched back in March. 
 For the 3rd ID the sequence of events now became rapid. 
The division, premised on the assumption of trench warfare 
training, was to be moved to a quiet sector near Toul; on 
28 May it was to relieve the U.S. 28th Division at Boucq. By 
the 31st it had been recalled to the Vosges, between Thann 
and St. Die. The Germans tempestuous progress toward and 
approaching the Marne River would necessitate yet another 
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move for the division: the move would take the 3rd to 
immediate field service and combat, as will be discussed 
later in the narrative.17 
 In his book, Dickman shared his thoughts concerning 
the Allied position and how they planned to use American 
soldiers within their own armies: “…Upon landing in 
England, March 13, 1918…the question was already a year 
old.” He continues: 
 
    According to the original plan we were to send 
over thousands of expert workmen to labor for the 
French; and such soldiers as we might send were to be 
put into French battalions, losing their identity…and 
being controlled entirely by French officers…. 
To suppose that liberty-loving 
Americans would take kindly to serving in a 
subordinate capacity in a foreign country, in a 
foreign uniform and under a foreign flag, with foreign 
officers commanding them in an unknown language, was 
going far. 
 
During a conference in March 1918 at Abbeville, aware of 
the new German drive of the 21st, Pershing allowed some 
flexibility of American troops but never wavered from his 
static policy of an independent American Army. In the end 
the conferees of the meeting agreed that “It is the opinion 
of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry out the 
war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be 
                                                
17Dickman, 44-47.  
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formed as soon as possible under its own commander and 
under its own flag.”18 
General Pershing met with a delegation from Paris 
first in the U.S. and again a few months later upon his 
arrival in France in June 1917; both meetings centered on 
the question of how American troops could best be used; 
however, the meeting in France was slightly altered. The 
original plan called for transporting from the U.S. to 
France thousands of skilled workers for employment by the 
French; also included in the provision was a plan to send 
U.S. combat troops for the sole purpose of reinforcing 
French battalions, to bring them up to their regular 
battalion strength. The British requested similar 
deployments from the AEF. What was neither debatable nor 
questionable in Pershing’s opinion was that, after being 
deployed and enveloped by British and French armies, 
American troops would almost certainly lose their identity 
while under the command of British and French officers. For 
Dickman, the British and French demands were seen as having 
a total lack of respect for the American Army and “the 
dignity of the American nation and of an imposition on our 
good nature.” He goes on to say: 
                                                
18Dickman, 255-259.  
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Vast financial and material assistance had 
already been rendered to the Allies under very 
‘benevolent’ neutrality. Although thus encouraged, it 
still required a good deal of assurance to make a 
proposal so far from flattering to our national pride, 
especially on the part of the British, who did not use 
soldiers from other parts of their Empire, as little 
prepared for war as we were, namely, Canadians, 
Australians and New Zealanders, to fill up the 
depleted ranks of their Tommies.19 
 
While most diligently appealing for the systemization 
of an exclusive AEF which, incidentally, could not be 
intelligently refuted, Pershing’s goals were to be 
postponed due to a German offensive that began in March, 
1918. Pershing’s relentless goal of an exclusive AEF would 
be, as a first step, secured under the London Agreement. 
The agreement, enacted 24 April 1918, stipulated that upon 
the completion of U.S. Army Division and Corps training 
they shall be organized, used, and commanded by Americans. 
The Supreme War Council agreed that the U.S. should, as 
soon as possible, form its own army under its own command 
and flying its own flag. Prior to the London Agreement, on 
6 March 1918, the chief of the French mission with the 
American Army, General Ragueneau, issued his own report 
regarding the formation of an entirely independent American 
Army: 
 
                                                
19Ibid.  
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Another consequence of this state of mind is that 
all the Americans contemplate the formation of an army 
purely American, without mixture with the other 
Allies. They are unanimous on this point….They do not 
wish to hear any talk about an amalgamation in which 
the American Army would lose its personality. They are 
all opposed to it and are supported by American public 
opinion…. 
 The last instructions from Washington are 
too positive, and correspond too closely to the 
unanimous sentiment of the American people and their 
Army, for us to be able to do anything by insisting: 
we would only develop a useless tension.20 
        
 After General Max von Boehm’s Seventh Army destroyed 
three French divisions at Chemin de Dames on 27 May 1918 
there was, again, a mass exodus of people fleeing Paris. 
This emergency, even in the face of the London Agreement, 
allowed Foch (Commander in Chief of the Supreme War 
Council) to take immediate, albeit temporary, control of 
American forces. This development pushed the European 
commanders to contact Washington directly, through their 
respective governments, to try and persuade the U.S. 
Government to turn over their forces to Foch’s control and 
even, if possible, to have Pershing removed as AEF 
Commander. 
 The French commander’s insistence on overall command, 
however, proved to be futile. As at the very outset of U.S. 
involvement, U.S. leaders were unwavering in their stance 
                                                
20Dickman, 258-259.  
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of an independent AEF. The emergency did not call for 
Foch’s temporary command over some U.S. divisions, which 
were scattered for miles among French and British troops; 
the move benefited no Allied army and provided the AEF with 
no significant instructions and only added to further 
dispersion of U.S. troops. The day would come, however, 
when AEF troops would be fighting under their own flag and 
following the orders of American commanders.21 
Realizing in early 1918 that the unrestricted 
submarine warfare, indiscriminately relaunched in February 
1917, was not working and had indeed failed, Ludendorff and 
Hindenburg, wrongly assuming it would take the United 
States at least six months to arrive in force on the 
European mainland, concluded that it was time either to 
defeat the Entente---once and for all---or be defeated 
themselves. Ludendorff and Hindenburg, preparing a final 
plan for a decisive strike, had several reasons to foresee 
a successful outcome. The Russian revolution made available 
the immediate transfer of German manpower to the Western 
Front; the Italian’s miserable showing at Caporetto forced 
the British and French to send troops to stabilize the 
Italian front; the so called French mutinies of 1917 
reduced French effectiveness; massive British losses at 
                                                
21Dickman, 260-261.  
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Passchendale in 1917 had produced a crisis in the British 
war effort; and, in general, a serious decline in Allied 
manpower were all good reasons the German high command had 
for launching a final, all out assault on the Western 
Front.  
Tim Travis, a contributing author in Hew Strachan’s 
World War I: A History, opines on the Allied victories on 
the Western Front and how, in six critical places, “The 
Allied victories on the western front in 1918 really 
occurred.” He continues: 
 
       These were, first, halting the massive German 
    1918 Spring offensives; secondly, mounting the 
    decisive French counter-offensive at the Marne on 
    18 July; thirdly, the successful 
    Australian/Canadian/British 
    Amiens offensive of 8 August; fourthly, the 
    continuing arrival of the American Expeditionary 
    Force (AEF); fifthly, the sweeping allied 
    Offensives of late September; and lastly, the 
    final allied pursuit of the retreating German army 
    in October and early November, leading to the 
    armistice of 11 November 1918.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22
 Hew Strachan, World War I: A History (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 278. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ROCK OF THE MARNE 
    Appearing behind the forward positions of the German 1st 
Army, just Northeast of Reims, Kaiser Wilhelm on the 
evening of 14 July 1918 was awaiting the German H-Hour to 
cross the Marne River: a German surprise attack with Paris 
as its objective. However, there was to be no such surprise 
at all. In the mid-evening of the 14th a company of French 
infantry made a daring raid across no-mans-land and 
straight into German forward posts, bagging twenty-seven 
German prisoners and, most importantly, intelligence 
documents stating times and places of impending German 
attacks. Word of the imminent attack was passed up and down 
the Allied front line via runners and telephone, passing 
along the urgent message to command posts and elements of 
the French Fourth Army. There would be no German surprise 
attack. Comprised of the German 10th and 36th Divisions of 
the German Seventh Army, the most concentrated and heaviest 
attack would fall upon the American Third Infantry Division 
and the French 125th Division, which was to the right of the 
U.S. 3rd ID.23 The attack of 15 July 1918 marked the last 
major German offensive of the war; from 18 July until the 
                                                
23 Joseph Gies, Crisis 1918 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), 204-205. 
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Armistice, the Allied forces would assume all subsequent 
offensives.24  
Throughout 1917 Allied commanders anticipated certain 
German offensives to begin in the spring and summer of 
1918; the Germans, indeed, were preparing operational plans 
for a “Great Offensive” in the spring of 1918. Not to be a 
decisive, knockout blow, but instead to split the British 
and French forces and in the process deal a staggering 
defeat to the British, Operation Michael called for a 
series of five individual operations stretching across the 
northern part of the Western Front. The leading German 
commanders Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von 
Ludendorff decided at a conference on 27 December 1917 for 
the go ahead to begin making preparations for the offensive 
with code names such as “George I” and “George II”, “Mars”, 
“Michael I, II, III”, “Castor and Pollux” (Verdun), and 
“Strassburg”; the Germans launched the main attack, 
Michael, on 21 march 1918.25 The initial drive was 
spearheaded by the German Third, First, Ninth, and Seventh 
Armies of the German Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group.26 
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By early summer the German drive had stalled at the 
approach to Paris. 
 By the first of July 1918, however successful (but 
not decisive) the first four German drives had been, 
political unrest and discontent in Germany thus far in the 
war was at its zenith. Not unaware of these political 
developments, the German military commanders realized full 
well the importance of victory on the fifth and final 
assault against the Marne salient. The German objective, 
besides maintaining the initiative and capturing French 
prisoners and material, was twofold: take the rail hub of 
Reims and thereby control the railway running southwest to 
Chateau-Thierry, giving the German army more room to 
maneuver and, the second, seize Paris.27 
    By 15 July 1918 sixteen American divisions on the 
Western Front were disposed among various British and 
French armies along a line stretching from the English 
Channel through Montdidier to Chateau-Thierry; through 
Reims, Verdun, and the St. Mihiel Salient, ending at the 
Swiss frontier at Basel.28 Six of these American divisions 
were in such a position to defend Paris via Chateau-
Thierry. Around the same time in July American troops were 
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arriving in France at the rate of about 10,000 per day; 
theretofore a few of the A.E.F.’s divisions had seen some 
form of combat and proved their worthiness on the 
battlefield, while other AEF forces needed more time to be 
trained. After training they would be moved to a sector of 
the line where it was thought fighting would be imminent. 
Extracted information from captured German prisoners 
revealed an attack by the Boche was set to begin at 
midnight on the 15th; this pertinent information would lead 
to serious German casualties and resulted in further 
demoralization of the German invaders. These casualties 
were a result of a spoiling offensive by Allied batteries 
initiated around 11:50 p.m. on the 14th, just ten minutes 
before the German attack was set to begin. 
What would later be known as the last major German 
offensive of the war opened up around 12:10 a.m. as German 
gas rounds and explosive artillery shells were fired onto 
Allied lines. The more than eighty German batteries facing 
the 3rd ID continued to fire up and down the front for more 
than three hours.  Reaching as far back as seven miles in 
depth, German artillery was moved forward 300 yards to 
permit the first waves of German infantry to commence their 
attack, crossing in boats and under fire, trying to gain a 
foothold on the southern bank of the Marne. This 
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devastating German artillery continued, at different 
sections of the line at one time or another, for ten 
straight hours: rolling barrages commenced and around 3:50 
a.m. as the German batteries, with distances of 
approximately 165 yards and time rotations from seven to 
twelve minutes, depending on the terrain, harassed the men 
of the 3rd ID with great effect.29 
Adding to the maddening artillery fire the first wave 
of enemy troops the 3rd encountered by no means consisted of 
reserve or green German soldiers. They were “shock troops”, 
the original Stormtroopers: those troops who would harass 
and interdict who were young, tough, strong, and battle-
hardened---the Stosstruppen.30 
In the fifth and last German offensive of Operation 
Michael, Ludendorff had two objectives in mind, the first 
being minimal compared to the second (possibly the most 
important objective of all five offensives). If things went 
well enough and according to his plan, Ludendorff believed 
the second objective---the capture of Paris---could be 
achieved only by seizing the Surmelin Valley. The valley, 
near the town of Moulin, was the only gap, running along 
the south bank of the Marne in an east-west direction, 
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capable of supporting a large modern army. It was in this 
valley where Major General Joseph Dickman’s 3rd ID was 
holding the line, directly in front of Ludendorff.  
The United States Third Infantry Division was attached to 
General Jean DeGoutte’s Fifth French Army and, with it, two 
Italian divisions plus the American 28th Division. The 
French Fifth Division was on Dickman’s eastern flank; 
combined, these forces would play a highly significant part 
in that sector of fighting but, alone, the American 3rd ID 
would play a crucial role in the defense of the Surmelin 
Valley.31   
     Deploying the division on 30 May, Dickman skillfully 
positioned his forces in depth: he ordered two infantry 
regiments to the bank of the Marne that was closest to his 
position and held two more in reserve, where they would 
sometime later be moved up to the Marne to join the two 
infantry regiments already there. Dickman would follow up 
his defense by ordering the division’s 4th Infantry Regiment 
to Chateau-Thierry; the 4th would later be joined by the 7th 
and 30th Infantry Regiments. Dickman placed the 38th Infantry 
at the point where the Surmelin River joined the Marne, in 
direct opposition to the German 10th Division. The 38th and 
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30th, either by fate or by consequence, were the two 
infantry regiments of the 3rd ID that would eventually be 
tasked with holding the valley. These regiments, commanded 
by Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander and Colonel Edward 
Luther Butts, respectively, would be responsible for the 
division’s leap into history.32  
Colonel Butts graduated from West Point in 1890, 
making him one of the youngest regimental commanders in the 
AEF. Detail oriented and thorough, he was respected by his 
colleagues and considered an icon by, and to, his troops. 
He had a professional and somewhat friendly relationship 
with McAlexander. These two commanders and their men would 
not only make the difference in halting the German advance, 
but also would make a lasting impact on the initially 
negative German opinions of not just the AEF as a whole, 
but on the individual spirit and fighting capabilities of 
the average American soldier.33 
Colonel U.G. McAlexander, West Point class of 1887, 
was known as a competent if not difficult commander; he 
originally was with the 1st Division where he commanded the 
18th Infantry. Major Jesse Woolridge, commanding company G, 
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on the left of the Surmelin River and in front of the 
Paris-Metz road, would later write of McAlexander as being 
the “pre-eminent among the great battle leaders of all 
time.”34 Companies H & E, along with Wooldridge’s G, held 
the first delaying positions and were deployed along the 
southern bank of the Marne. The first delaying position was 
directly in front of the German 6th Grenadier Guard, 4th and 
398th Infantries of the German 10th Division. As previously 
mentioned the Germans used in their attack the 
Stosstruppen, which constituted the 6th Grenadiers, Kaiser 
Wilhelm’s favorite shock troops.35 
Defense of the Surmelin Valley posed a difficult 
problem and it was here that not only McAlexander but also 
General Dickman would come into confrontation with the 
sector commander, General DeGoutte. Dickman surmised the 
best method of defending the valley, with its hills to the 
east and west and flat ground near the northern approaches 
to the Marne riverbank and Surmelin River, was with an 
“elastic defense” as opposed to a defense-in-force tactic. 
DeGoutte’s order to stand and fight was a surprise to 
Dickman, for the French were the pioneers of the elastic 
defense maneuver: a weaker force nearer the front which, 
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when pressed to its limit of fighting capability, would 
pull back toward the main force--further back---out of 
enemy artillery range. Dickman, disobeying DeGoutte’s 
orders, instead formed a defense in depth and, in order to 
placate DeGoutte, slightly beefed up his very thin front 
line. What really mattered to Dickman was positioning 
troops on the hills of the valley, maintaining defensive 
positions on the heights, and trusting his own judgment 
about the defensive positions and postures of his men.36 
     Around midnight on 14-15 July Colonel Georg 
Bruchmuller, chief of artillery for General von Hutier, 
both of them famous for developing the offensive tactics 
that had broken the trench stalemate, ordered artillery 
fire to commence, whereupon 6,400 German guns 
simultaneously sounded off. Gas shells whirred their way 
toward the Allied rear trenches as high explosive (HE) 
shells ground and pitted the earth up and down the Marne 
Front. On the German right (McAlexander’s West), after an 
approximately three hour artillery preparation had ended, 
engineers and front line Soldaten began preparing to cross 
the Marne, pulling river boats and rafts from concealed 
positions. As Allied machine-gun fire intensified the 
German shock troops, amassed in the woods for the first 
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wave of the assault, witnessed Allied fire that at times 
surpassed the fire of their own machine guns. In fact, the 
officer commanding the German 5th Grenadier Regiment sent a 
reconnaissance patrol to the front to assess the situation 
of the Sturmstruppen in that sector near the Marne Front: 
the 1st battalion of the 5th Grenadier Regiment, attacking 
the American 3rd ID, had been severely reduced by intense 
machine-gun fire as well as artillery and, as a result, a 
crossing of the river there was deemed impossible. This was 
a mere setback for the Germans, as the German 7th army 
crossed the Marne and occupied the Allies’ first positions 
on the front.37 
Following the preemptive French artillery bombardment, 
the German 6th Grenadier Regiment (of the German 10th 
Division) at 0330 hours on 15 July attacked Woolridge’s G 
Company along the river; first encountering stiff 
resistance the German 6th Grenadiers, after an hour of 
intense fighting with both Company G directly and indirect 
machine-gun fire from the 30th Infantry Regiment, managed to 
gain a foothold on the south bank of the Marne. In the 
process Woolridge’s front platoon was all but destroyed. 
The remnants of his forces pulled back and began a fighting 
retreat to the railroad bank, when Woolridge moved up his 
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reserve platoons and buttressed the forward positions. 
Although G Company was forced back, the Germans paid a 
heavy price as the 3rd ID machine-gunners literally 
disintegrated the advancing German troops. Woolridge would 
later boast of his soldiers’ accomplishments on killing the 
enemy as the German advance switched from “a soldiers 
maneuver into a military omelet.”38 
The fifth offensive of Operation Michael would be the 
final and most concentrated of the German assaults, the 
last ditch effort of a desperate German army trying to 
bring about a successful end to the war. Since March the 
Germans had possessed the offensive and had badly 
demoralized British and French troops; it seemed, at least 
to Ludendorff and Hindenburg that if the German army was 
successful in this last major assault chances of complete 
victory would, at last, be at hand. Unlike their British 
and French counterparts and to a degree the AEF, morale in 
the German army reached a level not seen since the first 
year of the war: this too would pass, and rather quickly.39 
     Major Guy I. Rowe commanded the Second Battalion, 38th 
Infantry Regiment, of the Third Infantry Division during 
the battle. A cool headed commander under fire, 
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knowledgeable in his understanding of leading men into 
battle and through fierce enemy opposition, Rowe was 
respected by his commanders and revered by his 
subordinates. Rowe believed it to be a useless task to try 
and train men in the necessities of fine soldering “unless 
confidence in the integrity of one another is developed at 
the same time.”40 
   An excellent system as well as a smart way in which to 
exert control over troops and operations, Major Rowe 
required all his captains to write nightly reports of their 
platoons’ locations and operations: from the bottom up, 
McAlexander had complete control of the 38th Infantry 
Regiment. Major Woolridge, from an excerpt in his book 
concerning McAlexander's leadership skills, wrote that 
“genius is knowing what to do next; knowledge is knowing 
how to do it; and virtue is doing it.” He goes on to 
explain what it was like during the opening phase of the 
battle, when the Germans attacked: 
 
         Out of a night as black as the mouth of hell they 
came. Eighty four German batteries…consolidated their 
fire on the Surmelin valley for four solid hours, with 
a fury never before equaled, according to French 
observers, not even at Verdun. Gone were the [French 
civilians]…fleeing before the scourge, with his high 
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explosive, shrapnel, poison gas, thermite, machine-
guns and aeroplanes.41 
 
     The overall Allied command of the American 3rd ID was 
under the French Sixth Army, commanded by General DeGoutte; 
commanded by General Debeney the French XXXVIII Corps was 
in direct command of the division near the front, in the 
sector of Champagne-Marne. In its official history the 
United States Army writes of the Champagne-Marne battle: 
 
        The heaviest attack fell on the front of the 
   American 3rd Division and the French division on its 
   right (the 125th) which were in line on the south bank of 
   the river, in and adjacent to the valley of the SURMELIN 
   [sic] Creek. The attack here was made by the German 10th 
   and 36th Divisions of the Seventh Army. They crossed the 
   river and drove back the French, and were able to make 
   but little progress against the American 6th Brigade, 
   which consisted of the 38th Infantry (McAlexander) and 
   the 30th Infantry (Butts). The 38th Infantry held its 
   ground close to the river, although assailed on three 
   sides at once. It has since been known as the Rock of 
   the Marne. Fighting on this front was fierce throughout 
   most of the day of July 15; on the 16th, offensive 
   operations ceased all along the front. Having failed to 
   capture REIMS or to hold their slight gains against the 
   American 3rd Division, the Germans on the next day, July 
   17, gave over the attack and began a withdrawal.42 
 
    In war there are, among others, battalion and platoon 
movements, flank and counter-flank movements, lines being 
constantly redrawn on maps, and generals who take the fight 
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to the enemy. Also in war, on a more ‘bottom-up’, personal 
level, there are men whom commit personal acts of bravery, 
loyal and dedicated to their cause: as in previous American 
wars, World War I was no different. They came from all 
different parts of the U.S., spoke different languages, and 
were of mixed cultures: all those men put forth the 
character of the Doughboy in the blaze of battle. It is not 
the generals who fight the battles but instead it is the 
typical, average soldier; the young men who slug it out in 
the fields and hills and forests, who fight wars. These are 
the troops who determine the outcomes of battles, the 
outcome of wars. 
Woolridge, in Giants, wrote of “the American fighting 
men in the heat of battle.” He wrote of men remaining at 
their posts while all around them shells fell for hours, 
the sound deafening and the impact of artillery shells 
teeth shattering; soldiers on their bellies traversing 
fields to silence enemy machine-gun activity; men wresting 
weapons from the enemy and using the same weapons to 
silence them. There were men like Private Dickman, 
uncoordinated and spoke very little English, telling his 
comrades “go ahead and shoot ‘em, they can’t hurt 
you….Vatch, I get annoder”; and men like Sergeant Otto 
Wolz, severely wounded by shrapnel as he tried to rescue a 
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wounded comrade, remarking to his C.O. (before attempting 
the rescue), “I will probably not make it in the face of 
that [German] shelling, but I’ll try it for a pal.”43 
Woolridge also writes of the bravery he witnessed of 
enemy soldiers. As two U.S. soldiers were fighting on the 
first line of the front they were charged by enemy troops. 
One of the men was wounded in the head and the other was 
trying to dress it when “a [German] charge came over the 
top. Phillips seized Delsoldartos’ rifle and bayoneted a 
Prussian officer, and then this officer…steadied his hand 
by pressing his elbow on the ground and in his dying gasp 
shot Phillips…through the brain.” Another account involved 
Woolridge himself. As he ordered a German officer P.O.W. to 
hand over his papers, the officer “holding his papers 
beyond my reach slowly tore them to bits, all the while 
looking me straight in the eye with never a flicker of his 
eyelid….[The German P.O.W.] preferred to have his orders 
taken that way than on demand.”44 
As a contribution to the history of the 3rd ID, Captain 
Fred S. Dever shared his experiences of the fighting at the 
Marne. Commissioned a First Lieutenant in 1917, Dever 
remained with the Third Division until the end of the war. 
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While attached to the 38th Infantry, he was tasked to dig 
trenches and construct wire defenses at the mouth of the 
Surmelin River, in the area of Moulin. “When the German 
bombardment began”, begins Dever, “we had no idea that the 
enemy was attempting advance, believing that it was merely 
a bombardment.” As hours passed---since the opening of 
German artillery fire---the bombardment stepped forward to 
the rear of the allied lines, to the rear of Devers’ 
forward position. Dever reported that a fellow Lieutenant 
told him that “the Germans had crossed the Marne in front 
of the 30th Infantry, with the result that the 30th had taken 
a number of prisoners.” Dever continues:45 
 
            I then continued on toward Conningis, and, on 
        arriving at the Paroy-Crezancy road, I met a 
        soldier of the 30th….And he told me that the 30th 
         
  Infantry was having ‘A Hell of a lot [sic] of 
        fighting and taking a lot of prisoners….’I started 
        up on the road towards Mezy….I found Lieut. Gay and 
        about fifty men. He told me that the Germans had 
        crossed in force in front of the 30th. [sic] and 
        that he was afraid the 30th. Had been shot up pretty 
        bad, and quite a few taken [as] prisoners….During 
        the night of July 15-16 we were moved to billets 
        near St. Eugene and to the west of that town, where 
        I remained for a day or two, when I took up work 
        with the Detachment [sic] of policing the 
        battlefield. 
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 An undated, special report covers the events of the 
3rd Division in its defense of the Marne as well as its 
counterattack. The report begins with the German attack on 
Chemin des Dames on 27 May, its success in overrunning 
territory as far south as the Marne and the subsequent, 
urgent actions taken by the Allies to halt the German 
advance. On 29 May the 3rd Division, moving from its 
training area from around Chateauvillian, took up forward 
positions along the south bend of the Marne River. The 7th 
Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division was the first unit 
on the scene, participating in action during the night of 
31 May, around Chateau-Thierry; for three days and nights, 
without reinforcement or supply, the 7th MG Battalion 
eventually stopped the German advance. 
In the days and weeks that followed, more units and 
reinforcements arrived, such as the 4th, 7th, 30th, and 38th 
Infantry Regiments; the 8th and 9th Machine Gun Battalions; 
and the 10th, 18th, and 76th Field Artillery Battalions. In 
support of this massive arsenal of firepower were the 5th 
Forward Signal Battalion, 3rd Trench Mortar Battery, and the 
6th Engineering Regiment. Also defending the line to the 
east of the 3rd Division was a small number (soon enlarged) 
of French corps artillery and half a French artillery 
brigade: this seemingly meager artillery support covered a 
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section of the front of over ten kilometers. The French 
support, during July 1-14, were exponentially increased and 
had a decisive affect on the morning of the 14th and 15th.46 
The same report describes events following the initial 
German attack on the morning of 14-15 July: 
 
            The German crossing was attempted a little 
        before five o’ clock on the morning of July 15, and 
        until dark that evening the destruction of the 
        German regiments designated to cross the River 
        [sic] at four different points between the towns of 
        GIAND and JAULGONNE [sic], constituted a continued 
        performance. 
       Although the rush of the German troops 
   overwhelmed some of the front-line positions, and 
   these units and the machine-gun companies in some 
   cases suffered a fifty percent loss, no German 
   soldier crossed the main road from FOSSOY to 
   CREZANCY, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon 
   of the following day there were no Germans in the 
   foreground of the 3rd Division Sector except the 
   dead. 
      During the days from July 16-19, the Division 
        [sic] remained in its sector on the Marne with its 
        right flank regiment facing to the east, as a 
        measure of self-protection against the German line 
        which had crossed the MARNE from the east side of 
        the JAULGONNE Bend to some point near CHATILLON. 
        Finally on the morning of July 20, three French 
        Divisions attacked the line only to find that the 
        enemy had retired to the north side of the Marne on 
        the previous night. 
 
    A report of 5 August 1918, written by Major Charles W. 
Foster, states that “four general lines of defense had been 
organized”, but constructed “in a rather elemental stage.” 
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Notwithstanding the apparent weakness of the American 
forward defensive line, divisional orders held fast that 
all units must hold their respective positions and that any 
lost ground must be immediately retaken through 
counterattack. During the first part of July German 
artillery batteries, as witnessed by American observers, 
were receiving reinforcements. However, by the 14th, a 
decrease had been noted by A.E.F. F.O.’s (Forward 
Observers) that German artillery activity had decreased, 
yet their infantry activity had increased: a sure sign of 
imminent attack.47 
Due to the German prisoners’ statements as to when the 
attack would commence, on 14 July the 3rd Division’s 
artillery opened up with a preemptive gas attack around 
11:30 p.m.: aware the Germans would attack around midnight, 
these preemptive bombardments were a definite necessity. At 
the initial phase of the German bombardment, different 
forms of gas were used: mustard gas was employed in the 3rd 
Divisions rear areas while other forms of gas were used in 
the forward areas where the German units would advance. A 
report of 21 July 1918 by the 3rd Division’s gas officer, 
Major W.M. Somervall, details the areas of the battlefront 
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where the Germans dropped their gas ordinance and, just as 
importantly, where they did not drop gas shells. Somervall 
wrote of the gas attack: 
 
            No gas in appreciable quantities was used on 
        the slope toward the river Marne, and the few gas 
        shells reported north of the Plateau [sic] may be 
        considered accidents. 
            A count of shell holes in the shelled area 
        indicates that about 1000 gas shells per sq. 
        kilometer were used during the first three hours of 
        the bombardment. 
      Gases used were Diphosgene, Chlopierin, Yperite, 
        Diphenychloraraine, and Ethyldichlorarsine. 
      Mustard gas was used only on the area to the 
        rear….Lethal lachramatory gases were freely used, 
        however, in all rear areas. 
      Gas discipline in the various units was 
        excellent….Respirators were quickly adjusted, men 
        kept cool, and in spite of intense shelling with 
        gas, shrapnel and H.E., lasting over six hours, the 
        actual casualties were few. 
 
Total American casualties due to gas attacks from 14 
July through 20 July were 1,256. Somervall concludes that 
considering the intensity and duration of the German gas 
attack, that American troops were not entrenched, and the 
fact that only a few dugouts were completed and 
serviceable, “the showing of the division is very good---an 
opinion concurred in by all observers who were on the 
ground.”48 
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In his preliminary report of 23 July Brigadier General 
Crawford, commander of the 6th Brigade, 3rd I.D., stated that 
up until around the first of July the German Air Force in 
the Marne sector had little opposition, flying their 
missions freely over the 30th Infantry’s area of operations. 
The result was accurate German intelligence as to where to 
concentrate their artillery fire; the 30th Division’s trench 
fortifications and troops were subsequently fired upon with 
deadly precision, as was the entire subsector of the 
regiment. Crawford wrote of the fighting: 
 
      ….When the attack began the defense was automatic 
      It was 
      a platoon commander’s fight….It would seem that 
      soon after the bombardment opened, midnight or five 
      minutes later, the enemy began his crossing 
      operations which was vigorously opposed all along 
      the front of the Brigade. Due to the configuration 
      of the ground the 38th Infantry was more successful 
      than the 30th in preventing the crossing so that not 
      as many crossed east of Mezy as did down the river 
      from that town. 
     It was a free for all fight with small units in the 
  dark, doing great execution to the enemy and throwing 
  his plans into complete confusion. 
     They [the Germans] attempted to organize their 
  mixed troops, but the frontal fire delivered by the 
  30thInfantry, the section of the units near the river, 
  and the fire from the heights above Moulins and the 
  slopes south produced as much confusion and dismay 
   that the Germans who were shock troops of the best 
   quality and highest spirits in the German Army 
   surrendered in groups of all sizes and individuals. 
   Resistance ceased, they threw down their arms and 
 46
   became anxious only that they be taken to the rear.49 
 
    Colonel T.M. Anderson, commander of the 7th Infantry 
Regiment, on 17 July 1918 wrote a report praising one of 
his officers, Lt. H.L. White, for heroic actions between 
14-17 July. On the morning of the 16th Lt. White was ordered 
“to take the 3rd Platoon of M Company and take up position 
on the hill in front of Bois D’ Aigremont at all costs.” 
Along the way White and his men found wounded Americans as 
well as Germans, a swath of ground near Mezy strewn with 
dead Germans, and two Maxim Guns. In one instance, as 
German soldiers tried to cross the Marne in boats and over 
bridges, they had to turn back because “the 7th Infantry’s 
fire that turned loose on them was so hot that the enemy 
could not hold their position.” All that and more occurred 
during intense German artillery bombardment. In his report, 
Lt. White wrote: 
 
        We have been under heavy shell fire from the Boche 
    ever since the night of the 14th, and have had nothing 
    to eat or drink, nor have we had any sleep since that 
    time. My men were exhausted and they sat down, not 
    being able to stand any longer, with their bayonets 
    toward the Boche and said: “Let them come.” They were 
    so weak they could not stand, but were there ready to 
    receive them when they arrived. Their orders were “To 
    hold at all costs” and they did hold. 
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        All the men on the front line were absolutely 
    exhausted. They have been put on the front line and 
    won’t move back at any cost. Corporal Brice, Company M 
    [7th Infantry Regiment], accompanied all patrols that 
    were sent out from my platoon and his work was very 
    commendable. 
 
Lt. White goes on to describe the murderous artillery 
of the Germans. Although the Americans were taking hundreds 
of casualties due to exposure from a lack of trench 
fortifications, he wrote that “This regiment has not only 
held its ground, which it was told to hold at all costs, 
but it has even taken over ground that was not expected of 
it….I consider the action of this shell-torn and gas-
shattered regiment most commendable, even deserving of the 
highest praise.”50 
On 18 July an American patrol combing the woods just 
south of Mezy where the Boche, attacking three days 
earlier, were driven back revealed that approximately five-
thousand German soldiers had been killed that first day of 
battle. The German dead, piled three and four deep, was 
proof to the Americans that men vs. machine-guns is a 
struggle best left alone. If the ratio in World War I was 
one killed for every four wounded, then the total number of 
German casualties would likely have been 20,000. Even the 
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Kaiser’s tough 10th Guard Division did not escape the wrath 
of the 3rd Division: the entire 10th Guard, one of five that 
attacked, engaged from across the Marne and but a few made 
it back to their original position on the north bank. 
German prisoners taken after the first day of battle 
testified that an entire battalion of the 10th Guard was 
destroyed and the remaining battalion was left with only 
company strength. 
One reason the Boche suffered such terrible losses on 
the first day was that due to such large numbers of Germans 
in the attack, the Americans pulled back into the woods 
where they might better hold their position. Outwitting 
their enemy, the Americans enticed German troops over 
prearranged areas where small squads of men lay hidden in a 
plethora of nests: as the Germans passed by the Americans 
were able to open fire at will. 51 
 Advancing from the region of Jaulgonne after intense 
artillery bombardment five German divisions attacked the 
Americans, advancing about two and a half miles in 
approximately three hours. On the night of the fifteenth 
American forces destroyed the German pontoon bridges and 
took 1,500 prisoners, including an entire German Brigade 
Staff. The French commander in the area, General DeGoutte 
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(6th French Army), lauded the American troops after they 
drove the Germans back to the railway that fringed the 
Marne. The German attack on the fifteenth was launched in 
territory where Attila, the dynamic Hun leader, met 
disaster: the Catalunian Fields. The Germans chose that 
territory for its straight roads, as they would be 
imperative for their drive to Paris. As the Germans did in 
1916 at Verdun they struck left and right, alternately, as 
a means to overwhelm the enemy and reach Paris. The extreme 
limits of the German offensive were in the west, in the 
vicinity of Chateau-Thierry; in the east a fight with the 
French---and the 28th Pennsylvania National Guard Division--
raged at Main de Massiges. A French official made a 
statement on 15 July concerning the day’s actions: 
 
        The German attack launched this morning at 4:30 
      o’clock continued throughout the day on both sides of 
      Rheims with equal violence. West of Rheims desperate 
      engagements were fought…south of the Marne, which the 
      enemy succeeded in crossing….A spirited counterattack 
      carried out by American troops drove back on the 
      right bank of the river enemy contingents….Between 
      Dormans and Rheims the Franco-Italian troops reacted 
      with tenacity….The enemy multiplied his efforts…in 
      the regions north of Prosnes and Souain, but was not 
      able, despite repeated attacks, to cut into our 
      combat positions.52 
 
                                                
52The Washington Post, 16 July 1918. 
 50
Major Guy Rowe, commander of the Second Battalion of 
the 38th Infantry Regiment, held a position just east of 
Mezy on a stretch of railroad line. Resolved to hold the 
line until the last man Captain Jesse Woolridge, under 
Rowe’s command, assembled a command of approximately two 
hundred men and took position among the rocky terrain of 
Mezy. Three counterattacks later he managed to detain 
around three hundred German prisoners. Directly east of 
Woolridge was the 125th French division which, soon after 
the first indications of an all out German assault, 
retreated for about five miles to the south. When doing so 
they failed to inform the members of the (attached) 
American 28th Division. Many from the 28th were killed or 
taken prisoner that day. It is no wonder they earned the 
nickname the ‘Bleeding Keystone Division’.53 As a result of 
the French retreat the German 36th Division in that sector 
captured Varennes and continued their southward advance 
until finally stopped by Co. F of the 38th Infantry 
Regiment. Now being attacked from not only their frontal 
and western flanks, the 38th Infantry Regiment also had to 
contend with a German assault on their eastern flank. 
Surrounded, the 38th would fight it out with the Boche until 
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finally withdrawing and reorganizing their companies to 
continue the fight another day.54 Kurt Hesse, a soldier in 
the German 5th Grenadier Regiment, wrote of the days events. 
After being assured on 30 May by the Kaiser that “To-morrow 
[sic] we shall march on Paris”, Hesse wrote of the reality 
of the situation on the Marne that day: 
 
            Scarcely ever have I experienced such a dark 
        night as the one from July 14th to 15th….The air 
        filled with gas. The hardships for our men were 
        enormous…. At last! A mad artillery fire 
        started….The enemy had begun [artillery 
        bombardment]….No word has come yet, if the 
        crossing has succeeded….The attack has halted. A 
        strong enemy prevents farther advance….The 
        [artillery] striking in the forest is terrible, 
        nerve-racking….Put on the gas masks! One could not 
        see anything before---now still less! Many are 
        seized with a dull despair. 
 
He continues describing the events of those terrible 
days in mid-July: Gas, deafening artillery, black of night 
being lighted up from high explosive shells, and the 
screams of his wounded and dying comrades. He and his 
comrades hoped for a rest because “A day like the 15th of 
July affects body and nerves for weeks”, and the 
 
    …infinitely dear comrades we had left over there 
 [on the other side of the Marne]. Many of them we had 
 not been able to lay in the earth….Then the report 
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 reached us: trouble to the right. The enemy, 
 enormously strong, has attacked from the woods of 
 Villers-Cotterets….We must go back.55 
 
The casualties sustained by the 38th on the first day 
of fighting accounted for about 25 percent of the entire 
divisional strength; it is a tribute to the overall command 
of the division that the number of casualties were not 
greatly increased. Pershing would later write that “a 
single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most 
brilliant pages in the annals of military history in 
preventing the crossing [of Germans] at certain points on 
its front, while on either side the Germans, who had gained 
a footing, pressed forward.” From the French command the 
38th received the Croix de Guerre as well as a citation, 
which read:56 
 
        A superior regiment which, under the energetic and 
    able command of its chief, Colonel McAlexander, gave 
    proof of unshakeable tenacity in the course of the 
    German onset of the 15th of July, 1918. Attacked in 
    front and outflanked on the right and left for several 
    kilometers, it remained, in spite of everything, on the 
    bank of the Marne, faithful to its mission, and 
    repulsed the enemy, superior in number, taking from him 
    more than two hundred prisoners. 
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As of 16 July 1918 along the American lines on the 
Marne, the Kaiser’s troops in some places were held back 
and in other places were completely repulsed, retreating to 
their original positions. The German pursuit of their 
overall objective, Paris, let alone gaining much ground 
toward that end, was all but halted. Counterattacks by the 
allies to the southwest of Jaulgonne retook territory the 
Germans had taken just one day prior; territory in the 
Marne sector changed sides many times since the first day 
of battle. During the fifth and final offensive of 
Operation Michael German troop morale was at a steady 
decline: since the 15th the Germans were repeatedly beaten 
back, were suffering enormous losses, and had no hope for 
reinforcements. Germany’s manpower had run out; in the area 
of the Marne, the German High Command’s plan had seemingly 
run its course. 
Chateau-Thierry was the point at which the Germans had 
hoped to pivot their forces and move westward toward Paris. 
As of 16 July not only had they failed to achieve that 
swing but, moreover, were driven back to their original 
lines of departure, just north of the Marne River. Edwin L. 
James, in an article of 17 July 1918 in the New York Times, 
writes of the individual heroism that the American fighting 
man possessed: 
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        Nineteen [Americans] of a platoon were left in a 
    certain position. There they stayed…until all their 
    ammunition was gone. Then…they leaped forward with 
    fixed bayonets and charged the German machine guns. The 
    [German] crews took one glance at those bayonets…and 
    stepped out into the open, hands above their heads, 
    yelling ‘Kamerad!’ The nineteen [Americans] brought 
    them back; there were thirty-eight of them [German 
    P.O.W.’s]. 
 
 
Also on the 16th many more German prisoners were taken 
as the American army on the Marne counterattacked. From St. 
Agnon-La Chapelle the Americans pushed the German forces 
back a little over a mile. At the southward bend in the 
Marne, between Fossoy and Joulgonne, the German forces had 
been routed and the area cleaned of all enemy opposition. 
Just south of the river, where the railroad parallels the 
bend of the Marne, American artillery and airplanes 
destroyed all remaining German troops within that sector of 
fighting; breaking all that was left of German resistance, 
the Americans east of Reims, in conjunction with the French 
forces in that sector, helped to further stabilize the 
precarious situation on that front. James continues writing 
that “There is no equal in France for the American soldier 
at close range, and that is how the foe must meet him in 
the days to come.” The American fighters are individuals 
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and “They never quit. As a German General reported to the 
Crown Prince…they ‘kill or are killed.’”57 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINAL BATTLES 
 
As the Second Battle of the Marne came to an end 
another was just beginning: The Aisne-Marne operation that 
raged from 18 July to 6 August 1918. Marshal Foch, fully 
aware of the progress the Germans had made in the Champagne 
sector, planned for a French-A.E.F. attack to be conducted 
on the western bank of the Marne Salient, on the Boche 
lines between the Marne and the Aisne.  If the Germans lost 
their principal railroad and Soissons, thereby losing their 
supply of weapons and equipment supporting their positions 
along the Marne (south) and Aisne (north), they would be 
forced to pull back from the western front of the Marne 
Salient. Marshal Petain would lead the attack and, if 
successful, would thereby officially end the German threat 
of taking Paris. The mission of the 3rd ID, by 18 July 
holding a position from Fossoy to the west and extending to 
Launay to the east, was to prevent the Germans’ passage of 
the Marne and protect the Surmeiln Valley from any further 
German incursion. 
 The French opened on 18 July what some have dubbed 
‘the beginning of the end’ for Germany’s military forces, 
and the war. The XX French Corps led the attack from the 
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Red Forest and, moving east, five days later the objective, 
the Soissons-Chateau Thierry highway, was taken. In vain, 
though swift and determined, the Germans moved forward 
thousands of disciplined, experienced troops. Perhaps 
unaware of the great opportunity available to him, Foch’s 
counter-offensive on the 18th was superb from the start. 
There were two main reasons the offensive was so 
successful: the first was that the commander of the German 
7th Army, General Max von Boehm, was expecting the attack to 
come from the south and, second, the German communications 
were parallel to their forward position, exactly what the 
French had destroyed.58 Contributing in the French westward 
attack was the American IV Corps, commanded by Major 
General Robert Lee Bullard, comprised of the 1st and 2nd 
Divisions. Also taking part in the attack was the 1st 
Moroccan Division as well as the French 58th and 69th 
Divisions.59 
 On 21 July the 3rd ID reported that the Germans were 
retreating along their entire front. During this time the 
divisions’ mission was to cross the Marne, gain contact 
with the Germans and inflict as many losses and casualties 
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as possible, and continue forcing the Germans to retreat.60 
The division continued in this manner, contacting and 
engaging the enemy as they pushed northwestward, throughout 
July and into early August.61 The 3rd was subsequently 
ordered on 12 July to Grodencourt, where it exercised 
training and maneuver operations, as well as recuperated; 
on 4 September it was transferred to Vaucoulers until 
finally, on 10 September 1918, the 3rd ID moved into the 
line as reserves in support of the 42nd (Rainbow), the 1st, 
and the 89th American Divisions. On 11 September the A.E.F., 
for the first time, fought as an entirely independent army 
commanded only by American officers: St Mihiel, unbeknownst 
at the time, was America’s opening act for future 
engagements on the European continent.62 
 It is of interest to note that around this time 
General Ludendorff no longer had confidence in his troops. 
The failed Michael Offensive, the Germans’ defeat of 15-17 
July, and the subsequent retreat throughout July and August 
demoralized his exhausted soldiers: his Sturmstruppen were 
all but annihilated during the spring offensives and what 
was left were soldiers less disciplined and of lower 
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morale. Marshal Paul von Hindenberg, as a means to 
invigorate and rally his army, issued an address on 6 
September 1918. It reads, in part: 
 
We are in the midst of a heavy battle with the   
foe. If numerical superiority alone were to 
guarantee victory, then Germany would long since 
have been crushed to the ground. The enemy knows, 
however, that Germany and her allies can never be 
vanquished by arms alone. 
….In the east we have forged peace, and in the 
west we are strong enough to do the same despite 
the Americans. But we must be strong and united. 
Why does the enemy incite colored races 
against the German soldiers? Because he wishes to 
annihilate us. 
The enemy also endeavors to sow dissension in 
our ranks…leaflets dropped from aeroplanes….There 
have always been some traitors in the 
Fatherland….Most of these now reside in neutral 
countries…to escape being executed as traitors. 
Be on your guard, German soldiers.63 
 
 The St. Mihiel assault of 12 September saw a unified, 
U.S. commanded offensive with French troops---for the first 
time---being led by American officers into battle. Five-
hundred thousand Americans supported by one-hundred 
thousand French troops battled back German soldiers for 
fifteen miles, to just south of Verdun: Pershing’s earlier 
insistence on individual, open-area fighting proved to be 
correct. Capturing German strongholds well ahead of 
schedule, the A.E.F.’s offensive disrupted the German 
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retreat to such an extent that Allied commanders argued 
that only by continuing the assault could they achieve a 
major breakthrough: continuing the assault on confused 
German soldiers would deny them any chance of reorganizing 
their defenses. The seemingly endless list of problems that 
earlier in 1917 strained American leadership seemed to 
disappear; the U.S. Army, apparently, had overcome its 
earlier problems of training, supply, and logistics. The 
St. Mihiel Salient, that territory in France known as the 
Woevre,64 was taken. The first truly American operation was 
a complete success.65 
 By the night of 13 September the St. Mihiel operation 
was essentially over, as the last remaining pockets of 
German resistance were being eliminated; the salient was 
sealed earlier in the day and all remaining enemy troops 
therein had been killed on taken as prisoners of war. On 16 
September 1918 the battle for the St. Mihiel Salient was 
officially over. The operation was so successful and the 
loss of American troops so little, it is arguable that the 
push could have successfully continued forward and the 
German lines of communication taken out at Briey. However, 
Allied plans called for those same American divisions so 
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successful in the St. Mihiel drive to be committed to the 
next operation, the Meuse-Argonne.66 However successful the 
St. Mihiel operation had been at driving the enemy back, 
German artillery and air power was still very active. Up to 
this point the First American Army had suffered 
approximately 100,000 casualties: fighting in heavily 
wooded areas and against strongly held trenches and 
fortifications made unavoidable such losses. 
 The biggest battle the American Army fought during the 
war was the Meuse-Argonne campaign: an area from just west 
of Verdun to a little east of Soissons. Extraordinary 
efforts involved superb planners, and the movement of 
troops---a shift of over forty miles from the St. Mihiel 
Front to a sector northwest paralleling the west bank of 
the Meuse---and supplies fell to the responsibility of the 
Operations Officer of the First Army, Colonel George C. 
Marshall. Completed in just under two weeks, the move was 
as bold as it was remarkable: over only three roads and 
confined to the cover of darkness, 600,000 American, 
220,000 French and Italian troops as well as 3,000 guns and 
40,000 tons of supplies made their way to the west bank of 
the Meuse. Marshall Foch’s objective was clear: cutting the 
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essential German rail lines and forcing them back, across 
the Hindenburg Line, inside their own territory by the end 
of the year.67 
 The Americans went ‘over the top’ at 5:30 a.m. on 26 
September: the First American Army in the center, III Corps 
in the east, and I Corps to the west. In support of I Corps 
was the fledgling 1st Tank Brigade, commanded by Lt. Colonel 
George S. Patton. This was the first time tanks had been 
used in such difficult conditions. The French small, two-
man Renaults and a few of the heavier French Schneider’s 
provided infantry support, as Patton advanced the tank 
force as an independent dimension of warfare: the tanks 
were to be used in a concentrated fashion in support of 
infantry rather than piecemeal amongst individual infantry 
units.68 
 After a brief setback, the 1st Tank brigade managed to 
destroy the German machine-guns; eventually, due to 
mechanical troubles and enemy action, the strength of the 
force was severely reduced. Although a minor one, the 1st 
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Tank Brigade did indeed play a part in the general fighting 
in the Meuse-Argonne.69 
 The first phase of the campaign planned for an axis of 
attack on the line Mountfacon-Romagne-Buzancy: if 
successful the Germans, after being pushed back in the 
center by American Third, Fifth, and First Corp’s, would 
have to retreat from the Argonne without the burden of 
having the Americans to attack and clear such difficult 
terrain. Relentlessly the U.S. forces attacked and on the 
second day Mountfacon was taken, while in the Argonne 
American forces were encountering tenacious German 
resistance. During the battle the 3rd ID replaced the 79th ID 
and was forced to direct a frontal assault against a 
determined, hostile enemy: subjected to artillery and 
cross-fire the Americans, especially those in the center 
positions, suffered heavily.70 It is debatable that, had the 
veteran 3rd ID been rotated earlier into the front line, 
Mountfacon would have fallen on the first day: if the 
divisions’ combat reputation theretofore held weight---“it 
may be killed but it cannot be conquered”---it likely would 
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have suffered heavy, heavy casualties. 71 Writing of the 
battle that day, General Pershing reported that 
 
The assault of 26 September surprised the 
Germans and disrupted their defense, but this 
situation was only momentary. From that day on 
the fighting was probably unsurpassed during the 
World War for dogged determination on both sides. 
Each foot of ground was stubbornly contested and 
hostile troops took advantage of every available 
spot from which to pour enfilade and crossfire 
into the advancing American troops….72 
 
 3 October 1918 marked the second phase of the Meuse-
Argonne struggle. Honed by experience the Americans knew 
that it was the second assault against the by now 
reinforced, after a few days’ lull in the fighting, 
fortified enemy that would require the hardest fighting. 
Supported by numerous French tank battalions the 3rd ID 
launched its attack on 4 October, its objectives being Bois 
de Ogons, Bois de Cunel, and the heights just east of 
Romagne. By 11 a.m. Bois de Cunel had been reached but not 
taken; heavy German machine-gun fire halted the Americans, 
and communications were hampered due to weather and human 
error. German planes machine-gunned the 30th Infantry 
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Regiment as it tried to move forward, although two of the 
planes were shot down by superbly accurate small-arms fire. 
 The forward line of the 3rd ID continued to advance 
slowly on 5 October: bitter and stubborn German resistance 
slowed their advance, particularly in the area of Bios de 
Cunel. An Adjutant of the 5th Brigade, 3rd ID, reported that 
“Three times the infantry tried to advance across the field 
into Bois de Cunel, and each time the line melted away. 
This space was thoroughly covered by machine gun [sic] 
fire.”73  
 On 7 October the 4th Infantry Regiment, 3rd ID, 
discontinued its direct assault on the Bois de Cunel, 
instead reorganizing for an attack in the northern edge of 
the Argonne: after three gallant attempts on 6 October, 
under deadly machine-gun fire, to overrun the Bois de 
Cunel, the twenty or so men of Company C (same regiment) 
were withdrawn for a later attack on the Bois de Beuge. 
Throughout the 7th and 8th American artillery continued to 
barrage the enemy: rolling barrages harassed the German 
positions from just south of the Bois de Cunel and 
continued in a northerly direction past the Germans’ 
Mamelle Trench Line. Men from the 30th and 38th Infantry 
Regiments were sent forward and suffered heavy casualties 
                                                
73Part III: Argonne-Meuse Operation, 1-8.  
 66
from German machine-gun fire; the 38th Regiments line was 
now only a mere seventy-five yards from the German line. 
High Explosive shells and Phosgene gas was used on the 
German line: units of the 3rd ID were finally able to 
overcome the Germans and take on the 9th the Mamelle Trench 
as well as the Bois de Cunel. As the 3rd advanced slowly 
under heavy machine-gun fire they finally crossed the 
Hindenburg Line on 9 October 1918: that windy, elongated 
honeycomb of defenses, so easily defended due to the 
rolling ground and the ability of the Germans to use such 
terrain, was breached. 
 11 October brought renewed American attacks that, 
while no immediate material signs were made, continued to 
further demoralize, strain, and exhaust a retreating German 
Army. American lines were improved and prisoners taken: 
interrogation reports determined that entire regiments of 
the German Army were dissipating in the face of the 
American onslaught. By the morning of 12-13 October the 3rd 
ID had secured a line from Cirges-Romagne Road to a 
position very near the Meuse River.74 
 After forty-seven days of intense combat involving 
over one-million American troops, suffering 117,000 
casualties, the Americans pushed back forty-three German 
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divisions over a distance of thirty miles, capturing over 
400 enemy guns and killing or wounding over 120,000 German 
troops.75 
 The war did not go quietly: the final six months of 
the war were worse that the previous years of constant 
stalemate as the men had, finally, come out of the 
trenches. Hostilities officially ended on 11 November 1918 
and the Germans on 28 June 1919 signed the Treaty of 
Versailles, exactly five years to the day Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian’s bullet. A total 
of 9,469,982 Americans would serve during the war: the U.S. 
suffered 116,516 deaths and another 204,002 casualties. 
53,402 were battle deaths and more than 63,000 deaths were 
categorized as “other deaths”.76 The war in the United 
States was quickly forgotten, however, and remains the 
first ‘forgotten war’ of 20th Century U.S. history. 
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